The authors report a meta-analysis of high-quality studies published from 1990-1998 on the efficacy of manualized psychotherapies for depression, panic disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) that bear on the clinical utility and external validity of empirically supported therapies. The results suggest that a substantial proportion of patients with panic improve and remain improved; that treatments for depression and GAD produce impressive short-term effects; that most patients in treatment for depression and GAD do not improve and remain improved at clinically meaningful follow-up intervals; and that screening procedures used in many studies raise questions about generalizability, particularly in light of a systematic relation across studies between exclusion rates and outcome. The data suggest the importance of reporting, in both clinical trials and metaanalyses, a range of outcome indices that provide a more comprehensive, multidimensional portrait of treatment effects and their generalizability. These include exclusion rates, percent improved, percent recovered, percent who remained improved or recovered at follow-up, percent seeking additional treatment at follow-up, and data on both completer and intent-to-treat samples.
calculate the lower bounds of generalizability of the treatment, the researcher can choose as the denominator the number of patients screened with symptoms of the disorder (whether or not they met thresholds defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [4th ed., DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994] ) or, more usefully, the number screened who had the disorder (if this is available from the research report) prior to application of exclusion criteria such as comorbid conditions. Use of the number of patients screened (whether or not they were included) as the denominator is clearly overly conservative, but it is useful for estimating the absolute lower limit of clinical generalizability because clinicians in everyday practice do not have the luxury of screening out patients who they have reason to believe will not respond. The higher the exclusion rate in efficacy research, and the more the exclusion rate is correlated with positive outcome, the more useful this lower limit becomes. For most controlled trials, the upper bound of effective efficacy would be the familiar intent-to-treat value. A higher upper limit estimate would be appropriate, however, if researchers deliberately excluded patients likely to succeed; for example, if they studied treatment-refractory cases.
A third measure of efficacy is the percent of patients who seek additional treatment. A considerable debate exists on how to think about patients who seek further treatment (Kendall, 1999) , as some patients may seek further treatment because they found the treatment they received useful. In general, however, patients who are satisfied with the gains they have made or who are genuinely free of their psychological symptoms are, presumably, unlikely to seek further treatment, unless they have other comorbid conditions that were left untreated or their treatment length was inadequate.
A fourth, and often overlooked, measure of efficacy is the absolute magnitude of mean symptoms at termination or follow-up. A treatment for depression might appear efficacious enough to recommend it as the treatment of choice if it produces a strong effect size (e.g., d = 0.8), but this conclusion may not be warranted if the average patient continues to suffer substantial, if substantially diminished, depressive symptoms. Such a finding would not only suggest incomplete treatment but also might predict relapse.
None of these indexes is inherently more valid than the others, and none should be taken as the sole index of a treatment's efficacy. A treatment that achieves 90% success with the 30% of patients who find it useful enough to complete is efficacious for a subset of the population, just as a treatment that produces an effect size of 1.2 relative to placebo may be useful even if it does not restore many patients to health, if other treatments are unlikely to do better. In the present study, we report data using each of these indexes, providing a range of values on the efficacy of ESTs for depression, panic, and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). This allows readers to consider the range of conclusions that can be drawn from the existing literature.
Initial Response Versus Sustained Efficacy
A second key issue is the distinction between initial response and sustained efficacy (that is, sustained improvement over time). Many psychological disorders, such as depression and GAD, show some initial response to virtually any kind of psychosocial intervention. In naturalistic studies, 15% of patients improve significantly after making the initial call to a therapist's office and before attending a first session (see Kopta, Howard, Lowry, & Beutler, 1994) . Further, Ilardi and Craighead (1994) reported that most of the treatment effects demonstrated in studies of cognitive therapy for depression occur by the fifth session, with treatment effects leveling off asymptotically after that. Although their data have not gone unchallenged , naturalistic studies have typically produced similar findings (Howard, Lueger, Maling, & Martinovich, 1993) , and recent research on bulimia has similarly found that patients whose symptoms do not decrease by 70% in the first six sessions are unlikely to respond to brief psychotherapy in clinical trials (Agras et al., 2000 ; see also Wilson, 1999) .
A key question is whether the treatment effects that occur before the 1st session, within the first 5 to 6 sessions, or over the complete course of a brief (6-to-20 session) treatment are lasting. In other areas of medicine a distinction between initial response and what is usually called efficacy is commonplace. A treatment for HIV that leads to initial suppression of the virus but does not continue to inhibit the virus beyond a few months would not be considered efficacious, although it might be used in combination with another treatment if the two together proved beneficial. As we will see, the limited data on long-term outcome of ESTs suggest that initial response may bear little relationship to efficacy at clinically meaningful follow-up intervals (Shea, Elkin, et al., 1992; Snyder, Wills, & Grady-Fletcher, 1991) . Apropos are data from effectiveness studies suggesting that longer-term treatments may produce more robust effects and may be useful in the treatment of the polysymptomatic presentations that are the norm in clinical practice (Kopta et al., 1994; Morrison & Westen, 2000; Seligman, 1995) .
Treatment of States Versus Treatment of Disorders
A related distinction is between the treatment of states and the treatment of disorders. A trip to the emergency room can be highly efficacious for the treatment of intense despair and suicidality, but it is not a treatment for a longstanding or intermittent depressive disorder or for a personality disorder that provides a diathesis for depression. Data on the natural course of depression suggest that major depressive episodes (depressive states) resolve in gradual stepwise reductions of symptoms over time, with 54% of patients recovering at 6 months, 70% within 1 year, and 88% by 5 years (Keller, Lavori, Mueller, & Endicott, 1992). However, the risk of repeated episodes exceeds 85% over 10 to 15 years (Mueller et al., 1999 ). Individuals afflicted with major depressive disorder will experience, on average, four lifetime major depressive episodes of 20 weeks duration each and are likely to experience a variety of other depressive symptoms at other points (Judd, 1997).
Of relevance is research by Howard, Kopta and colleagues (Howard et al., 1993; Kopta et al., 1994) on phases in treatment associated with different processes of change. Howard et al. (1993) distinguished acute distress, which tends to resolve quickly; chronic distress, which resolves more slowly; and characterological problems, which tend to require the most time to address. After an initial "remoralization" period, in which the patient's hope is restored, symptom relief tends to occur in a "remediation" period that typically lasts approximately 16 weeks in naturalistic studies. The researchers suggest that enduring "rehabilitation" of longstanding problems is likely to require substantially longer, depending on the patient's degree and type of characterological impairment.
To what degree the same techniques are effective in treating states (acute anxiety, depression, etc.) versus disorders (GAD, recurrent major depression, etc.) or diatheses for those disorders is unknown. The mechanisms of change may or may not be the same, and data on initial response or follow-up at brief intervals may be of little relevance to the question of whether a treatment is efficacious for treating a recurrent disorder, particularly one for which personality pathology provides an underlying vulnerability (see, e.g., Westen & Harnden-Fischer, 2001 ). Only long-term follow-up data can answer that question. As we show, such data are difficult to find even for disorders about which statements are common in the literature about treatment of choice.
Indeed, a treatment that is efficacious in the long run may be deleterious in the short run, or vice versa. Empirically, disclosure of painful events initially leads to both subjective pain and immune suppression; however, disclosure ultimately produces improvement in both mood and immune functioning (Pennebaker, 1997) . If treatment is limited to a few weeks and success measured at the end of that time, treatments likely to be highly beneficial in the long run may well appear inferior to other treatments, or even appear iatrogenic. On the basis of data obtained at limited follow-up intervals, researchers using dismantling designs, for example, could easily abandon useful techniques and preserve others that are less efficacious in the long run.
Empirically Unsupported Versus Empirically Untested
A final distinction is between empirically unsupported treatments-those that have been tested and demonstrated to lack efficacy-and empirically untested treatments-those that have not been tested. To infer that one treatment is more efficacious than another because one has been subjected to empirical scrutiny using a particular set of procedures and the other (e.g., long-term exploratory therapies) has not is a logical error, and a common one in the literature. To put it another way, we need to be careful to distinguish empirically unvalidated from empirically invalidated treatments.
Sometimes, of course, researchers do not test certain therapies because clinical experience suggests that they are not likely to be efficient or effective (e.g., psychoanalysis for fear of dogs following a dog bite). We suspect, however, that the differences between tested and untested treatments too often rest on less rational or empirical bases. For example, the fact that interpersonal therapy (IPT) is the only empirically supported treatment for bulimia other than cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) has less to do with clinical experience (e.g., that large numbers of clinicians had been practicing IPT with patients with bulimia and found that it had substantially improved their results) than with the facts that (a) the infrastructure was already in place to begin studying it (e.g., by adapting existing manuals) and (b) its proponents understand the importance of rigorous scientific investigation of treatment response. As we argue below, one might do well to apply scientific methods to the selection of treatments to test rather than assume that the best way to separate therapeutic gold from inert or iatrogenic lead is to use scientific methods to test hypotheses about a narrow range of treatments preselected for reasons that may be relatively arbitrary.
The Present Study
This article reports a multidimensional meta-analytic investigation designed to examine the evidentiary basis of ESTs for three common disorders-depression, panic, and GAD-and provide the entire range of efficacy coefficients described above (effect size, percent treatment success indexed using different numerators and denominators, etc.). We also address a series of questions bearing on external validity; most important, what percent of patients are screened out and does a relationship exist between exclusion rates and measures of efficacy?
Method

Selection of Studies
Tomaximize the quality of studies (and to limit the magnitude of the task), we identified a sample of studies on psychotherapy for adults with diagnoses of depression, panic (with or without agoraphobia), and GAD using a manual and computer search of high-quality, high-impact journals (selected a priori, before examining any data) that routinely publish efficacy research. We included studies published in the decade of the 1990s (until 1999, when the data were analyzed) from the following journals (in alphabetical order): Consulting and Clinical Psychology, The Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research, Psychotherapy, and Psychotherapy Research. Inclusion of only studies of the most recently refined treatments that used current methods (that is, beginning the search in 1990, rather than 1980 or 1970) and published in major publication outlets for efficacy studies (rather than including all published and unpublished studies, including file-drawer studies that often reduce effect size estimates; see Rosenthal, 1991) means that the findings can only be generalized to research that is methodologically relatively strong. Because of the paucity of studies uncovered with this method for GAD, we conducted an exhaustive computer search of Psychological Abstracts, using the key word generalized anxiety disorder, which turned up two additional articles.
To be included in this review, a study had to test the efficacy of a specific psychosocial treatment against a waiting-list control condition, an alternative psychotherapy, a pharmacotherapy, or some combination of these. 3 We included both initial publications and follow-up studies, provided the follow-up interval was 12 months or longer (an interval we chose because of its clinical meaningfulness for disorders such as major depression that tend to remit spontaneously after 20 weeks and show high rates of recurrence within 2 to 5 years). To be included, studies also had to include valid measures of outcome for the primary symptom 4 and to be experimental in design (including randomized patient assignment, standardized treatments, and blind outcome assessment); hence, studies on the naturalistic end of the continuum were excluded (e.g., Luborsky et al., 1996) . We also excluded studies if they (a) represented reanalyses of data already included in the meta-analysis, (b) were limited to highly specific subtypes or subpopulations of the disorder in question (e.g., depressed patients who somatize, elderly patients, adolescent patients, or fundamentalist Christians), or (c) were not primarily face-to-face psychosocial treatments (e.g., self-administered therapies such as bibliotherapy, biofeedback, telephone or computer-administered treatment, or didactic educational interventions administered in large groups).
Within these parameters, then, we included studies if they met the following criteria: The study (a) was published between 1990-1998, (b) was published in English, (c) had an experimental design, and (d) included outcome measures specifically targeted to symptoms of depression, panic, or GAD. Follow-up studies that appeared during this time period that represented continuations of research published before 1990 were included if they met study criteria (e.g., if they added a follow-up at intervals of 1 or 2 years). Thirty-four studies met our inclusion criteria and are included in the review (with asterisks in the reference section). Twenty-three others were excluded prior to examination of the data because they did not meet minimal criteria for randomized controlled trials (e.g., outcome was not assessed masked to experimental condition; see Appendix A). 5
Procedure
It is worth noting at the outset that decisions about how to code or define variables reflected our consistent effort to give the treatments under consideration the "benefit of the doubt." We chose to do this because we had undertaken this study from a critical perspective; were aware of pervasive allegiance effects in psychotherapy research (including the likelihood of our own); and, hence, wanted to prevent where possible any intrusion or appearance of bias. Thus, at each step we attempted to make methodological choices, prior to examination of the data where possible, that maximized efficacy estimates.
We report meta-analytic data for each disorder at each of three assessment periods: termination, 12-18-month follow-up, and 24+-month follow-up. Variables assessed (described more thoroughly below) included number of participants, percent of patients who met initial criteria who were included (screened into the study), percent of patients who completed treatment, percent of patients who improved with treatment, percent who remained improved at each follow-up interval, effect size, mean posttreatment symptomatology at each follow-up interval (e.g., mean BDI scores at termination), and percent at follow-up who sought additional treatment. Because we were interested in what the average patient can expect to receive from the average EST, and because research by Luborsky et al. (1999) and others has documented that up to 70% of the variance in outcome across state-of-the-art efficacy studies can be predicted by investigator allegiance, data reported here are collapsed across all active treatments in each study, excluding conditions described as control conditions or interventions that included pharmacotherapy. Appendixes B-D list each study, its active and control conditions, and the data we extracted and analyzed.
With respect to specific variables that may require clarification, number of participants refers to the number of people who actually began treatment (i.e., the number who were randomized to any given treatment condition minus those who never attended the first treatment session). 6 Percent completed refers to the percentage of patients who completed the treatments. Percent included describes the percentage of patients who survived the screening process, which typically occurred after a patient was referred or self-referred for the disorder under investigation and often after a telephone screen. Researchers frequently did not provide either of these Ns, and rarely reported both. Where possible, we chose the number screened out after an initial screen, to provide the most generous estimate of treatment effects.
With respect to percent improved, definitions of improvement varied substantially from study to study, a problem we addressed in two ways. 7 In our primary analyses, we used whatever definition the researchers reported, to maximize, once again, the likelihood of positive findings, because researchers tend to put their best foot (or data) forward. We also coded the data for stringency of improvement criteria using a 1-4 scale and, in a secondary analysis, correlated stringency with percent improved across studies. This yielded no significant correlations for any of the three disorders, suggesting that the collapsed data provide a reasonable summary metric. 8 With respect to the denominator, we provide data on percent improved in three ways: as the number of patients considered improved by the investigators divided by (a) the number who completed treatment; (b) the number who entered treatment, whether or not they completed (intentto-treat sample); and (c) the number of patients screened who appeared to have the disorder, where this could be discerned, to provide a lower estimate of generalizability, presuming that researchers were not excluding patients arbitrarily.
For measures of posttreatment and follow-up symptomatology, we report mean scores on outcome measures for each disorder. Because different outcome measures may vary in their reliability and validity, to calculate effect size, we used a hierarchical procedure, giving priority to the most widely used, reliable, and valid measures of each symptom and to those with the least demand characteristics (i.e., masked ratings made by objective observers). Thus, for depression, we used scores from the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1967) ; when this measure was not available, we used the BDI. For GAD, we used the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HARS; Hamilton, 1959) first, followed by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) . (In secondary analyses, we compared effect sizes using these different instruments, which turned out to have no impact on the findings.) For panic disorder, for which researchers used a variety of measures, we relied, first, on the patient's self-reported frequency of panic attacks and, second, on the mean number of panic symptoms endorsed. Where none of these measures was available, we selected the outcome measure that produced the largest effect size, again maximizing the likelihood of obtaining positive outcomes. For panic, as for the other disorders, these different measures tended to yield equivalent effect size estimates.
To measure effect size, we used Cohen's d (Cohen, 1988) , which was calculated using the following formula: (mean of treatment group − mean of control group)/pooled pretest standard deviations. We used the pretreatment standard deviations, once again, to maximize effect size. Experimental conditions were considered controls if (a) they were not recognized as an established treatment (e.g., the investigators created an "expressive therapy" condition to compare with the experimental treatment of interest); (b) the investigators made no attempt to standardize treatments in those conditions; or (c) the authors explicitly referred to them as a placebo, control, or "treatment-as-usual" condition. 9 (The only gray area we encountered in making these determinations was the differential use of applied relaxation, which was sometimes described as a treatment and sometimes as control condition for depression.)
Finally, because many studies did not include either a control group or the descriptive statistics necessary to calculate between-treatment effect sizes, we also calculated within-treatment effects using the equation (pretest mean − posttest mean)/pretest standard deviation. Although widely reported, this statistic is not very meaningful because it confounds genuine effects with placebo effects, the effects of passage of time, the effects of common factors, and the fact that people tend to seek treatment when their distress is very acute and, hence, does not allow the kind of causal inferences that are the virtue of experimental designs.
Results
The results cover 12 studies of depression, 17 studies of panic, and 5 studies of GAD (Appendixes B-D). (Thirty-four studies, of course, represent the results of more than 34 research reports, because for data analytic purposes, all articles describing the same sample constitute a single study.) Together these studies included a total of 2,414 participants. We calculated both unweighted and weighted means (weighting for variables such as sample size and stringency of criteria for determining clinically significant improvement), but as in all cases the results were similar, we report here only the unweighted means. Where appropriate, we also report medians, to avoid undue impact of outliers. Tables 1-3 summarize the most important findings. 10
Inclusion and Completion Rates
Inclusion.
For all three disorders, the majority of patients were excluded from participating in the average study. Inclusion rates were 32% for depression, 36% for panic, and 35% for GAD. For most studies (across all disorders), researchers appropriately excluded patients with psychotic, bipolar, or organic disorders. Additional exclusion criteria were as follows.
The prototypical study of treatment for depression excluded patients for suicidality or comorbid substance use disorders. Several studies also excluded patients who had one or more of the following: GAD, panic disorder, antisocial personality disorder, severe obsessional symptoms, schizotypal features, or significant physical problems. Several excluded patients if these comorbid conditions were considered primary but did not define how that determination was made (or report reliability of that determination). The majority of studies required a diagnosis of major depressive disorder for inclusion.
The prototypical exclusion criteria for panic were moderate to severe agoraphobic avoidance, any concurrent Axis I or Axis II disorder in need of immediate treatment, major depression deemed primary, and recent previous therapy. In addition, most studies excluded patients for suicidality or substance abuse.
The prototypical GAD exclusion criteria included major depression, substance use disorders, and suicidality. Many GAD studies also excluded patients with dysthymic disorder, somatic disorders, panic, past psychosocial treatment, current substance abuse, or obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Studies of depression tended to be less restrictive than studies of panic or GAD, which generally excluded the most common comorbid conditions. However, exclusion criteria for all three disorders often eliminated more troubled and difficult-to-treat patients, such as patients with borderline features (who are likely, for example, to be suicidal and to have substance use disorders).
Completion.
The percentages of completers in these studies were relatively high: 74% for depression, 86% for panic, and 84% for GAD.
Initial Response Effect size.
With respect to effect size, initial response was generally impressive. For studies that included and reported adequate data on control groups (n = 13, or 38% of the total sample), the average effect size at termination (Cohen's d) was small for depression but large for panic and GAD (here we report medians, because the standard deviations tended to be much larger than the means, so that the medians are more readily interpretable): Mdns = 0.3, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively. These findings are strong and particularly meaningful because they control for both time and at least some nonspecific factors (depending on the nature and credibility of the placebo condition). Pre-post effect sizes were very large (we revert to means here because of substantially smaller relative variance): for depression, M = 2.23 (SD = 0.78); for panic, M = 1.55 (SD = 1.24); and for GAD, M = 2.09 (SD = 0.76). As noted above, however, this metric is difficult to interpret because of the number of variables that could account for changes over many months, particularly in the absence of comparable data for participants in placebo control conditions.
Percent improved.
Roughly 73% of studies reported on the percentage of participants classified as improved posttreatment. Of depressed patients who completed treatment, 54% were deemed improved. The comparable percentages for panic and GAD were 63% and 52%, respectively. For the intent-to-treat group (including those who did not complete), improvement rates were 37% for depression, 54% for panic, and 44% for GAD. 11 The lower limit estimate of efficacy, percent improved of those screened (including those not treated because of exclusion criteria), was low (not surprisingly, given high exclusion rates): 14% for depression, 19% for panic, and 10% for GAD.
Posttreatment symptomatology.
A variable that has received little attention in either primary studies or meta-analytic reviews bearing on the question of the efficacy of ESTs is whether they actually lead to what most patients and clinicians would consider cure. At termination, depressed patients averaged 8.68 (SD = 6.49) on the HRSD and 10.98 (SD = 8.60) on the BDI. Although this was a substantial improvement from pretreatment, the degree of continued symptomatology did not constitute a return to mental health, and the large standard deviations point to substantial variability in treatment response. In fact, both of these means are above the criteria used by researchers to indicate clinically significant depression. For example, Pilkonis, Heape, Ruddy, and Serrao (1991) recommended HRSD scores below 6 and BDI scores below 9 as indicative of recovery. Using Jacobson and Truax's (1991) criterion of patients' scores being closer to published norms of nonclinical than of clinical samples, Bouchard et al. (1996) used a cutoff of 7.86 for the BDI to indicate clinically significant change.
Similar findings emerged for panic: The average patient continued to panic slightly less than once a week (0.74 times per week, SD = 1.20) and endorsed a total of 4.14 panic symptoms (SD = 3.49) of the 7 required for a DSM-IV diagnosis of panic disorder-enough, in fact, to qualify as limited symptom attacks. For GAD, the average patient continued to score 11.03 (SD = 6.18) on the HARS and 47.45 (SD = 9.33) on the STAI-T. By and large, these findings, relative to published norms (where available), suggest that the average patient receives substantial benefit but continues, even at termination, to have mild symptoms of the disorder for which he or she was treated.
Follow-Up
Oneof the most striking things about Tables 1-3 is the sheer lack of data on follow-up at 12 months or longer. We could locate only 9 experimental studies with follow-up at 12-18 months and only 4 with extended follow-up at 24+ months for all three disorders combined. Of these 13 studies, several have methodological problems that render conclusions drawn from them potentially problematic. 12 The follow-up data at 12-18 months were largely similar to the data at termination except that (a) a clearly observable waxing and waning of symptoms in both improved and unimproved patients was apparent, which is characteristic of the natural course of the disorders; and (b) of those who initially improved, in most cases, there was a small-to-moderate decrease in efficacy over time.
With respect to effect size, data comparing treated and untreated groups are rare at 12-18 months, primarily reflecting the ethical problem of keeping patients treatment free for such an extended period. For depression, the single exception, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Project found no difference between control and treatment conditions at 18 months. The single GAD study that included data on a comparison group without offering them further treatment found a moderate-to-strong treatment versus control effect size of .65. By and large, the only effect size data available at 1 year and beyond were pre-post data, which generally showed that patients tended to improve even beyond their initial termination posttreatment levels, suggesting continued treatment effects posttreatment or spontaneous remission over time.
With respect to percent improved, a crucial distinction in follow-up studies is between percent improved and percent remained improved. The former capitalizes on chance factors and naturally occurring symptom fluctuation (i.e., treatment failures can appear to become treatment successes over time in disorders that naturally remit or fluctuate over several months to a year), whereas the latter does not. Thus, we focus here on the stability of treatment effects; namely, on how likely patients who improved with treatment were to remain improved (what we called sustained efficacy). Of the 11 studies reporting on 12-18-month follow-up, 5 (45.0%) provided data on the percent of patients who were improved or recovered at termination and remained improved. For depression, 36.6% of patients who completed remained improved, and 28.5% of the intent-to-treat sample got better and stayed better. Unfortunately, none of the studies for GAD and only 1 study for panic provided information on whether the same participants remained improved. The single panic study produced impressive results: 86% of the completer sample and 73.0% of the intent-to-treat sample improved and maintained their treatment gains between termination and 12-18-month follow-up.
With respect to posttreatment symptomatology, depressed patients at 12-18 months averaged scores of 7.79 (SD = 8.18) on the BDI, which represents an improvement from the first posttreatment assessment, although this finding is based on only one study. Similar findings emerged for panic, where at follow-up the average patient continued to panic 0.69 (SD = 1.40) times per week. In the single study providing these data on GAD, the average patient continued to score 12.0 on the HARS.
With respect to percent seeking additional treatment, slightly under one third of studies provided data on this variable between termination and 12-18-month assessment (n = 11; 29%) and, when they did, the data were often not systematically gathered (e.g., unstructured telephone contact). For depression, of those studies providing relevant data, 28% of patients reported receiving further treatment. For panic and GAD, the rates were 35% and 45%, respectively. On average, then, 36% of all treatment completers engaged in some form of additional psychosocial therapy within 12-18 months.
Two years.
At 2 years and beyond, data are almost nonexistent. Hence, most of the data we report here are from single studies. With respect to effect size, no comparisons between active and control groups were available.
With respect to percent improved, the data reported here are based on single studies for both depression and GAD and on two studies for panic. Once again, we focus here on the percent who remained improved. Of the four studies reporting on 24+-month follow-up, two (50%) provided data on the percent of patients who were recovered at termination and remained improved. For depression, 38% of patients who completed treatment remained improved. Stated differently, 27% of those who initially entered treatment (and 8% of those who were originally screened) improved and remained improved 2 years later. These data are comparable to the 18-month follow-up data from the NIMH TDCRP. For panic, the percentages are, again, much more impressive: Fifty-four percent of completers and 46% of the intent-to-treat sample remained improved. For GAD, we could not locate any study that provided relevant data.
With respect to posttreatment symptomatology, all results reported here are based on single studies. Depressed patients at 24+ months averaged 8.80 (SD = 7.90) on the BDI, panic patients continued to panic 0.87 (SD = 1.55) times per week, and no data were available for GAD.
Finally, with respect to the percent seeking additional treatment, of the four studies reporting on extended follow-up, four studies reported whether patients sought additional treatment between termination and 2 years after treatment. Roughly half of the patients received further treatment, an increase beyond the 28% found to have done the same by 12-18 months.
Relation Between Exclusion Rates and Outcome
One of the advantages of meta-analytic techniques is that they allow researchers to uncover mediators and moderators that might not be apparent from single studies. Of particular importance to assessing the generalizability of the findings of these studies is the correlation between the percentage of patients who improved with treatment and the percentage of patients excluded in each study. The experimental wisdom of stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria is maximization of diagnostic homogeneity. The parallel pitfall is diminished external validity. When researchers exclude 70% of depressed patients from efficacy studies, they cannot legitimately generalize to any but a minority of depressed patients-unless, at the very least, other data suggest that the remaining 70% of patients are likely to respond similarly, in which case exclusion would have been unnecessary. We consider these analyses preliminary. However, the meta-analytic data provide preliminary evidence that researchers may have been wise to exclude patients in several of these studies on the basis of concerns about treatment efficacy in polysymptomatic patients. 13 We report statistical significance here conservatively, considering studies, not patients, as sampling units. This means, with sample sizes typically of less than 10 studies for each analysis, that we have minimal power to detect significant findings. 14 However, the findings are highly suggestive and form a clear pattern, and many of the effect sizes are large by Cohen's (1988) standards.
Two findings were consistent across all three samples: a systematic relation between the percent of patients excluded from studies and (a) the percentage of patients who improved and (b) the percent who sought additional treatment. For simplicity, we report here only the findings collapsing across all three diagnoses (that is, including studies of all three disorders in each analysis, standardizing the data within each of the three samples, and then aggregating across samples where appropriate). The correlation between percent excluded and percent improved at termination was r(14) = .41 (where the sampling unit, and, hence, the degrees of freedom, refers to studies rather than patients). Thus, the more patients excluded in a given study, the higher the percent of patients who showed improvement. Too few studies were available at 12-18 months and 2 years to provide reliable data (because many studies did not report inclusion rates).
The correlation between percent excluded and percent seeking additional treatment at any point beyond 12 months was r(8) = −.40. Thus, the more patients excluded from a study, the fewer who subsequently sought further treatment. No other variables (notably effect size) demonstrated a systematic relation to exclusion rates across all three disorders.
Because exclusion rates can reflect many factors, in a secondary analysis, we simply counted the exclusion criteria for each study as described in the methods section of each article and correlated number of exclusion criteria with various measures of outcome. 15 In this analysis, the correlation with percent improved largely disappeared, but the correlation with percent seeking additional treatment doubled, to r(8) = −.81, p < .02. In addition, using this rough index of stringency of exclusion criteria, we identified a number of other highly suggestive findings, which, once again, we consider only preliminary. For all three disorders, number of exclusion criteria predicted both pre-versus post-effect size and absolute levels of pathology as measured by instruments such as the BDI, usually at both termination and follow-up. For example, in studies of depression, number of exclusion criteria predicted pre-post effect size at r(8) = .71, p = .05. The correlation between stringency of exclusion criteria and BDI and HRSD scores at termination was r(9) = −.63 and r(6) = −.41, respectively. In other words, the more stringent the exclusion criteria, the healthier the patients at the end of treatment. For panic, the correlation between number of exclusion criteria and pre-post effect size was r(14) = .48, p = .08. Exclusion criteria predicted mean number of panic attacks at 12-18-month follow-up, r(5) = −.53. Using the combination of (a) percent of patients excluded and (b) number of exclusion criteria to predict percent improved and pre-post effect size using simultaneous multiple regression, we were able to generate multiple Rs in the range of .50 to .75.
Discussion
We believe that an appropriately conservative, scientific attitude toward these findings leads to the following general conclusion. The average EST for the disorders we examined leads to substantial initial improvement in pathological states for roughly half of the patients who pass a series of rigorous inclusion and exclusion criteria that vary substantially across studies. The average patient in these studies who receives an active treatment is substantially better off than the average control patient at the end of treatment, supporting the utility of these treatments in reducing various forms of psychological distress. The limited data available suggest, however, that the majority of patients do not show sustained improvement over 1 to 2 years, particularly for generalized affect states (depression and GAD). We may do well to use terms such as empirically supported in more qualified ways, particularly in review articles, acknowledging limitations of samples, time frames, and ways of indexing outcome that can lead to different conclusions.
Exclusion Rates and External Validity
The greatest impediment to generalizing from these studies to clinical practice is the high exclusion rate from clinical trials for all three disorders. Many of the exclusion criteria used in the studies described here, such as the exclusion of patients with bipolar disorder or psychotic disorders in studies of treatments for unipolar depression, are appropriate and do not jeopardize external validity. In the average study, however, two thirds of patients who present for treatment with symptoms of the disorder are excluded, and the more patients excluded and the more stringent the exclusion criteria, the more successful the treatment. For clinicians who cannot pick and choose their patients, the applicability of these findings to clinical practice is largely unknown. Parallel findings obtained with a completely different methodology have recently emerged with respect to efficacy trials for treatment of alcohol related disorders: Humphreys and Weisner (2000) applied the prototypical exclusion criteria in alcohol treatment studies to two large community samples and found that typical exclusion criteria result in unrepresentative samples more heavily composed of White, stable, higher functioning patients with less-substantial comorbidity.
Although many exclusion criteria are scientifically and ethically appropriate, it is important to distinguish those that limit external validity. Here we note three.
First, exclusion of patients with particular forms of co-occurring disorders presents a serious challenge to external validity if (a) these comorbidities are common in clinical practice or (b) they affect treatment response, course, length, and so on. Existing data suggest that comorbidity is common, for instance, between depression and many Axis I and Axis II disorders and that this can, in fact, affect treatment response. Research using both community and clinical samples has shown that most individuals with one Axis I disorder have at least one other Axis I or Axis II condition (e.g., Kessler et al., 1996; Oldham et al., 1995; Shea, Widiger, & Klein, 1992) . By definition (because of the need for standardization of treatment focused on alleviating symptoms of a specific, usually Axis I, symptom), comorbid conditions are outside the scope of ESTs, except insofar as treatment of one condition can have secondary effects on other symptoms, which it often does.
Recent research suggests that the presence of multiple symptoms can have a substantial impact on both outcome in randomized controlled trials of ESTs and on the nature of treatment in everyday practice. For example, Frank et al. (2000) have recently shown that depressed patients with a lifetime history of panic-agoraphobia spectrum symptoms fare worse in clinical trials of both psychotherapy and medication (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors), and many researchers (e.g., Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Zimmerman, McDermut, & Mattia, 2000) have shown that the overlap of anxiety and mood disorders is very high, if not the norm. A naturalistic study of patients in treatment with experienced clinicians for clinically significant depressive, panic, or other anxiety symptoms found that clinicians of all theoretical orientations report treating the vast majority of patients for multiple problems; that the presence of Axis I and Axis II pathology tends to double treatment length; and that the presence of subclinical personality pathology (such as problems with self-esteem, constriction, inhibition, attachment, etc.), which was virtually ubiquitous in everyday practice, has a substantial impact on treatment length as well (Morrison & Westen, 2000) . Given that not all studies have found comorbidity to influence outcomes, future research clearly needs to begin to distinguish the disorders and treatments for which comorbidity does and does not affect outcome and, hence, those for which it may threaten external validity.
Second, a focus on patients who meet full criteria for Axis I disorders such as major depression and GAD, and the exclusion of patients whose pathology is subclinical using current standards, is scientifically sensible because it minimizes diagnostic variation and ensures that patients included in randomized controlled trials do in fact share the syndrome under investigation. However, internal validity often comes at a cost to external validity. Somewhere on the order of 50% of patients treated in everyday practice for mood, anxiety, personality, and many other psychiatric disorders appear to have subclinical pathology (e.g., Westen & Arkowitz-Westen, 1998; Zinbarg, Barlow, Liebowitz, & Street, 1994) . It may be that these patients are easier to treat than patients who meet full criteria, in which case the findings reported here may represent an underestimate of efficacy. At this point, however, we might do well to base the next generation of efficacy studies on data showing the kinds of patients who present for treatment in clinical practice rather than on patients who meet DSM-IV cutoffs.
Third, we would have liked to report the percent of patients excluded because they had bipolar disorder, had psychotic disorders, did not meet DSM-III-R (3rd ed., rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 1987) or DSM-IV criteria for the target disorder, were excluded before or after an initial telephone screen, and so forth. Unfortunately, those data, which are crucial for evaluating external validity, are rarely published.
It is important to note that most studies do not eliminate all comorbid conditions, and the trend, exemplified by the increasing emphasis on testing laboratory-based treatments in the community, is toward greater inclusion. Further, recent research taking some of these treatments into the community has produced some very promising early findings. One group of investigators (Stuart, Treat, & Wade, 2000) has replicated success rates for CBT for panic in a community mental health center (although with nonblind assessment at follow-up); another found that patients treated with exposure and response prevention for obsessive-compulsive disorder who were excluded from randomized controlled trials fared as well as patients included in research trials (Franklin, Abramowitz, Kozak, Levitt, & Foa, 2000) . These are very encouraging findings. Our aim is not to replace one inaccurate set of conclusions frequently drawn from this body of literature-for example, that CBT and IPT are the treatment of choice for depression and that other treatments should not be practiced, taught, or reimbursed-with another equally inaccurate, unbalanced conclusion-that these treatments are not useful. If researchers have excluded patients with substantial comorbidities and subclinical disturbances, it is not surprising that they have excluded 70% of patients who were referred by clinicians, self-referred, or passed initial phone screens, given the rates in the clinical population of subclinical pathology and comorbid conditions. The highly variable exclusion criteria used in these studies, however, make it difficult to know precisely who the population is to which many of these findings generalize and, within that population, who the 25% to 45% of those who enter treatment are who are likely to show a sustained response over 2 years. Identifying these subgroups should be a primary goal of future efficacy research.
Initial Response
In terms of initial response, compared with appropriate placebo control conditions, the studies summarized here demonstrate moderate-tostrong effect sizes: medians of 0.3 for depression, 0.8 for panic, and 0.9 for GAD. These effect sizes are clinically meaningful and comparable to those found over the past 2 decades of psychotherapy research (Smith & Glass, 1977; Wampold et al., 1997) .
With respect to percent improved, the studies document considerable variability in initial response for patients with all three disorders. Roughly half of patients who complete treatment experience initial clinical improvement, and of those who enter treatment (intent-to-treat group), approximately 40% will gain from it. The percentages are higher for patients treated for panic than for the other two disorders studied.
With respect to posttreatment symptomatology, the data suggest that in these treatments patients can expect a significant reduction in mean levels of symptomatology, which is clearly clinically meaningful. However, particularly for depression and GAD, the average patient will maintain a mild but clinically significant level of symptoms after treatment, and the high standard deviations on all measures (and data on percent improved) suggest that a substantial number of patients will continue to be highly symptomatic.
An appropriately positive rendering of these findings is that we have many efficacious treatments for reducing the severity of depressed and anxious states. The average patient will experience a substantial reduction in symptomatology, and roughly half of those who complete these treatments will benefit significantly from them. These are impressive and important findings.
Another way of describing the data, however, is less encouraging: Roughly 40% of patients from an unknown subpopulation who undertake these treatments will receive help, and the average patient who completes them will remain clinically depressed or anxious. For depression and GAD, many patients will experience improvement, but few will become asymptomatic. Whether return to healthy functioning would require longer treatments, sustained relapse prevention efforts (e.g., periodic booster sessions), or other or supplemental forms of treatment that address what appear to be some relatively durable diatheses is unknown.
Sustained Efficacy
In terms of sustained efficacy-the ability of these treatments to produce lasting symptomatic changes rather than solely an initial response-perhaps the most striking finding of these three meta-analyses is the paucity of follow-up data at 12-18 months (nine studies in as many years) and the virtual nonexistence of follow-up data at 2 years or longer (four studies across three disorders over 9 years). 16 The major study comparing experimental and placebo-control groups at 12-18 months (the NIMH TDCRP) found no differences in depressive symptoms. Pre-post effect size data suggest that some unspecified combination of variables leads to symptomatic improvement over time. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no one has systematically compared these pre-post effects with data on the natural course of these illnesses left untreated, so no conclusions can be drawn about treatment impact at 1 to 2 years.
With respect to percent improved, the findings suggest differences across the three disorders. The most positive rendering of the data on depression-namely, the number of patients who improved and remained improved of those who completed the treatment-is in the range of 36% to 38% at both 12-18 months and 2 years. Including patients who began the treatment but did not complete it, however, drops the improvement rate at 2 years to 27%. Thus, roughly one fourth of carefully screened patients with major depression, who are not suicidal and do not abuse alcohol or other drugs, can expect to improve and to remain improved 2 years later if they embark on a brief course of manualized treatment for depression. By any standards, it is difficult to construe these data as evidence for the hypothesis that these treatments show genuine efficacy for the treatment of depressive disorders (which recur with troubling regularity after any index episode) as opposed to depressed states.
For panic disorder, the data are much more positive. These findings accord with those of others who have reviewed the relevant literatures and concluded that the evidence for the efficacy of psychosocial (particularly cognitive-behavioral) treatments of anxiety disorders is higher than for other disorders (Roth & Fonagy, 1996) . Roughly half of patients who complete treatment can expect to improve and to remain improved at 2 years. Of those who enter treatment, improvement rates remain a hefty 46%. These are impressive results for a brief, cost-effective treatment of a syndrome that is often chronic and highly resistant to extinction. A more recent study found, further, that cognitive-behavioral treatment for panic helped prevent relapse and recurrence of panic following discontinuation of alprazolam several years after treatment (Bruce, Spiegel, & Hegel, 1999) . As noted by Brown and Barlow (1995) , however, more conservative measures of end-state functioning produce results more comparable to those reported here of the other two disorders. This suggests the need for continued treatment development to address functional impairments common in panic patients that may be related to panic, to comorbid conditions common in panic patients, or to personality variables associated with panic.
For GAD, the available data suggest that ESTs can produce an initial response, but data on sustained recovery are largely unavailable.
Percent of patients seeking additional treatment, particularly within months of terminating treatment, is a crucial variable bearing on genuine or sustained efficacy. Somewhere between one quarter and one half of patients treated for these disorders seek further treatment within 12-18 months, and roughly half seek further treatment by 2 years. (Unfortunately, few studies reported whether the patients who sought additional treatment sought it from the investigators and, hence, found the treatment useful, or whether they sought it elsewhere.) The negative correlation between exclusion rates and percent seeking additional treatment across disorders, and the extraordinarily high negative correlation between number of exclusion criteria and percent seeking treatment (r < −.80), suggest that for the substantial portion of the population of patients excluded from many of these studies, these treatments may not provide effective enough relief to prevent them from seeking further treatment within 1 to 2 years.
Limitations and Implications
The meta-analyses reported here have two primary limitations. First, to maximize the quality of studies (and to limit the magnitude of the task), we included only studies published in high-quality, high-profile journals, limiting the study to the decade of the 1990s. The list of journals was selected a priori and was based on methodological quality as well as on an initial literature search to determine the journals with the highest volume of outcome studies, so that we could be assured of missing few methodologically solid studies published during that period. Within these constraints, we were liberal with respect to inclusion. For example, we included studies with no control group, for two reasons: because many such studies reported data on percent improved, which more carefully controlled studies often did not, and because for established treatments researchers often included only comparison groups because of ethical concerns about assigning some patients to inert conditions. Nevertheless, our decision to begin in the 1990s rather than the 1970s or 1980s, and to include only journals to which researchers tend to send their best studies, could have led to unrecognized biases, which should be examined in future research. A more inclusive meta-analysis of controlled trials of psychotherapy for bulimia recently completed in our laboratory, which imposed no restrictions on journal quality or year of publication, is producing very similar findings.
Second, we do not believe we are immune to investigator allegiance effects. One of the major lessons of this study for us was just how much subjectivity routinely enters meta-analytic research, such as choice of studies to include or disqualify, choice of data to include or exclude within studies (e.g., when the investigators report complementary analyses with different sample sizes in different tables), and choice of variables to study or not to study. The problem of remaining blind in meta-analyses has not, we believe, been adequately addressed in the psychotherapy literature, because investigators' biases can subtly influence all of these decisions. Indeed, our own current research on emotional constraints on decision making (Westen & Arkowitz, 2001 ) made us suspect of our own such decisions and led us to make decisions wherever possible before collecting the data or before examining the data of a particular study (or, when this was not possible, to select the data from a given study that gave its authors the benefit of the doubt). As Abelson (1995) has argued, the aim of using statistics is not simply to lay out "the facts" but to make a principled argument. Although we endeavored to keep both our methods and our arguments principled, we recognize that countervailing "principles" may have guided our judgments when our conscious principles were not engaged; hence, we have included the data for individual studies so that researchers can independently evaluate our judgments.
Within the context of these limitations, we would point to three implications for future research. First, investigators should routinely report the range of efficacy estimates described here and report data and methodological details necessary for evaluating external as well as internal validity. The majority of the highest quality research reports in the period we studied did not include all or most of the information that would allow consumers of this research to judge the meaningfulness and generalizability of the findings, such as numbers of patients excluded for various reasons, reliability of diagnosis of both pre-and post-interviews, effect size estimates on both completer and intent-to-treat samples, percent of patients improved or recovered (and how and when criteria for improvement and recovery were selected), data on comorbidity and effect sizes for patients with and without key comorbidities (even if sample size does not permit significance testing), data on follow-up at clinically meaningful intervals (or reasons the researchers chose not to follow up large-N studies beyond 6-to-12 months), percent of patients seeking additional treatment (including reasons for seeking further treatment, kinds of treatment sought, and whether patients sought treatment or referrals from the investigators), and percent of patients who remain improved at follow-up. Meta-analysts and authors of review articles similarly should routinely report such data rather than solely reporting effect sizes.
In many respects, we are calling attention to criteria for conducting efficacy research that have already been outlined in the literature (see, in particular, Kendall, 1999) . We are suggesting, however, that the conclusions often drawn from this body of research need to be reexamined because of the extent to which research has diverged from these criteria. An analogy to a central issue in construct validation is of relevance here, namely Campbell and Fiske's (1959) concept of the multitrait-multimethod matrix. The construct validity of a measure is not threatened by a critical review of 35 studies when the reviewer looks for flaws in each study and inevitably finds them, as any competent graduate student could do. Every study is flawed, and if the errors are randomly distributed-that is, if the 35 studies do not share the same flaw-construct validity is not seriously threatened. If, on the other hand, 31 of the studies rely on self-reports as criterion variables and the studies that rely on other methods do not yield similar data, construct validity is in fact undermined. The same point can be made with respect to the studies we examined here: To the extent that most studies share particular characteristics of design or reporting, or show negative findings in certain key areas that have not been previously emphasized or aggregated meta-analytically (e.g., exclusion rates, mean posttreatment symptomatology, or follow-up data at longer intervals), then one may have reason to question what has often been taken as the central tendency of these studies, namely, that certain treatments can now be described with confidence as the treatment of choice, particularly for depression and GAD.
Two recent studies provide models for collecting and reporting data that permit independent assessment of their clinical utility. In a study of CBT for panic, Brown and Barlow (1995) assessed and reported data on variables crucial for assessing the sustained efficacy of treatments for panic, such as percent of patients seeking additional help, data on whether the patients who remain improved at 12 months are the same as those who remain improved at 24 months, measures of end-state functioning, and measures of general levels of adaptation and other Axis I pathology. In another study, the investigators included a figure, in the form of a tree with branches, which shows precisely how many patients are "lost" at each step of the way (Barlow, Gorman, Shear, & Woods, 2000), which we believe should become standard practice in all articles reporting efficacy data. Such figures allow readers to see the full picture, essentially presenting the data necessary for the reader to calculate improvement or recovery using almost any appropriate numerator and denominator.
A second implication concerns the nature of treatments to be tested in future efficacy research. The data on depression, and to a lesser degree (because of the absence of data at clinically meaningful follow-up intervals) on GAD, do not strike us as encouraging, especially for treatments that have undergone 20 years of testing and empirical refinement. When compared with the results of treatments for specific anxiety conditions (such as panic and simple phobia) and with what most consumers would reasonably expect is meant by "empirically supported," sustained efficacy rates of 25%-30% over 12-24 months are poor by almost any standards and suggest that we should begin testing different treatments for these disorders.
Whether the problem is one of inadequate treatment duration, inadequate theory or technique, or the intractability of the problems with current technologies is unclear. However, suggestive data come from a number of sources. That patients who complete brief treatments aimed at addressing generalized mood pathology would continue to show subclinical pathology, and that they would be highly vulnerable to relapse, makes considerable sense in light of data on the polysymptomatic nature of patients in clinical practice. Most treatments for depression in naturalistic samples unconstrained by managed care take roughly half a year for CBT and upward of 1 to 2 years for other forms of therapy, and as noted above, treatment length doubles across therapeutic modalities in the presence of comorbid conditions (Morrison & Westen, 2000) . The data from effectiveness studies similarly show that 3 to 4 months of treatment rarely lead to improvement in more than 50% of patients who complete treatment and that longer treatments are associated with better outcomes (Kopta et al., 1994; Seligman, 1995) .
The lack of sustained efficacy of treatments for depression and GAD also makes sense in light of developments in the cognitive neurosciences and social psychology demonstrating the importance of distinguishing between implicit and explicit cognitive, affective, and motivational processes that have different correlates and may require different forms of intervention (Westen, 1998; Westen, Feit, & Zittel, 1999) . Suggestive data relevant to treatment come from studies using implicit measures of depression, such as emotional Stroop tasks (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) or dream content (A. T. Beck, 1976) , which often find continued attentional biases toward depressive words and thematic content among remitted depressives. This suggests that changes in state may or may not be accompanied by changes in diatheses for those states encoded in implicit networks. The hypothesized existence of implicit cognitive, affective, and motivational processes (such as the activation of affect-laden networks of association outside of awareness) is precisely what motivated the development of longer term treatments a century ago. 17 A third implication, germane to recent calls for a closer link between research and practice (Goldfried & Wolfe, 1998; National Advisory Mental Health Council, 1999; Street, Niederehe, & Lebowitz, 2000) , pertains to the utility of supplementing efficacy studies (controlled clinical trials) with effectiveness studies, which have different sources of systematic error, and of distinguishing two ways effectiveness research can be implemented. In one approach, which might be called Type I effectiveness studies, researchers begin by developing experimental treatments through controlled clinical trials and, ultimately, test them on larger, more generalizable naturalistic samples. This is the primary way effectiveness has been interpreted and is guiding large-scale multisite effectiveness studies now in progress.
An alternative approach, which might be called Type II effectiveness studies, begins with treatments "designed" by clinicians, whose knowledge of research design may be limited but whose intervention strategies are likely to have evolved considerably through basic operant and social learning processes as well as theory and training. This approach acknowledges that those of us who do research necessarily have to limit our clinical hours and, hence, cannot extensively test potential innovations clinically before committing research efforts to them. Thus, this approach involves the creation of practice research networks consisting of large numbers of clinicians in the community. The aim is to capitalize on natural variation in clinical practice and therapeutic outcome to help develop prototypes of successful treatments that can help us determine which interventions to test experimentally.
Using this approach, a researcher might enlist the participation of a randomly selected sample of doctoral-level clinicians to recruit the next patient who presents for treatment of clinically significant depression, regardless of comorbidities or other presenting problems. Alternatively, a researcher might select clinicians nominated by peers from their own therapeutic orientation (e.g., psychodynamic and CBT) as expert clinicians, to maximize their chance of studying the best interventions available from each of the major treatments in wide use in clinical practice. Patients, clinicians, and independent assessors would then provide periodic data on a range of measures bearing on outcome over a period of several years, including not only self-reported symptoms but implicit measures of the same constructs, measures of personality, measures of other symptoms and disorders, and measures of adaptive functioning. In addition, clinicians would audiotape randomly selected therapy hours, which would be independently coded to assess therapeutic interventions and process (see also Borkovec & Castonguay, 1998) .
Aside from simply asking whether one treatment works better than another, this design would allow researchers to discover which features of actual treatments (intervention variables) are associated with outcome and to see what intervention strategies appear to work with what kinds of patients (intervention-outcome correlations), using variables such as severity, comorbidity, and personality as moderators. Instead of requiring individual investigators to predict a priori which treatments are most likely to work and, hence, worthy of a 10-year program of research, this approach allows us to determine empirically which interventions within the range of treatments practiced in the community are associated with success with particular kinds of patients (within, of course, the constraints provided by correlational data). We can then focus our experimental sights on the interventions that are most likely to pay off, as well as on promising experimentally derived interventions by researchers who have the benefit of thorough knowledge of the empirical literature.
The reality is that we do not know whether the small number of treatments tested in the laboratory fare better or worse in actual clinical practice than many of the interventions currently used by clinicians-or, more importantly, than the interventions used by the subset of clinicians who, empirically, produce the best results, if we were to find out who those clinicians are. We are thus suggesting that we expand the range of science to include clinical practice and the selection of treatments to test and that we use multiple research designs to try to converge on the most accurate conclusions (see Borkovec & Castonguay, 1998; Goldfried & Wolfe, 1998) . 1 A problem with the widely used criterion of 2 standard deviations above the mean of nonclinical samples is that it ignores base rates of the disorder in the population. If 5%-10% of the population is depressed at any given time, individuals with BDI scores 2 standard deviations above the mean in nonclinical samples are likely to be depressed. 2 An even more conservative way of estimating efficacy is to use the number of participants randomized as the denominator, on the assumption that attrition between randomization and entry into the study could reflect, in part, patients' initial attitudes toward the treatment on the basis of what they have understood from the investigator about its goals, methods, duration, and so forth. 3 Outcome studies examining maintenance therapies were not included because of the lack of comparability of findings. The small number of studies assessing such therapies typically test the impact of infrequent, ongoing therapeutic contact where the goal is primarily prophylactic. The majority of these studies focused on depression, and most found that about two-thirds of patients relapsed by 2-3 years (Frank & Kupfer, 1993; Frank et al., 1990) . Also excluded were composite studies where it was not explicit which treatments which patients had received (e.g., Chambless & Williams, 1995) , as well as studies that were primarily medication trials and did not include a placebo or a placebo plus psychosocial comparison group. 4 A number of studies of panic disorder neglected to report inclusion of any direct measure of panic symptoms (e.g., Rijiken et al., 1992; Telch et al., 1993; Wade et al., 1993 
